Information Papers

Nuclear Energy in Iran 

(November 2008)

Iran produced some 180 billion kWh in 2005 from 31 GWe of plant, giving per capita consumption of 1943 kWh/yr. 73% of electricity comes from gas, 18% from oil, both of which it has in abundance.

Nuclear power developments

In 1957 a civil nuclear program was established under the US Atoms for peace program.

In 1974 the Shah announced a target of 23,000 MWe of nuclear capacity to free up oil and gas for export.

In 1975 construction of two 1,200 MWe PWR units was started at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf by Siemens KWU. After the Islamic revolution, payment was withheld and work was abandoned early in 1979 with unit 1 substantially complete and unit two about half complete. The plant was damaged by Iraqi air strikes in 1984-88.

The Islamic Republic of Iran revived the nuclear power program in 1991 with a bilateral agreement with China for the supply of two 300 MW(e) PWR units of Chinese design, similar to the Qinshan power plant, but nothing eventuated.

In 1994, Russia's Minatom and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) agreed to complete unit 1 of Bushehr nuclear power plant with a VVER-1000 unit, using mostly the infrastructure already in place. However, this necessitated major changes, including fabrication of all the reactor components in Russia under a construction contract with Atomstroyexport. This 915 MWe plant, being constructed by Atomstroyexport, is nearing completion and is expected to start up late in 2008, with commercial operation mid 2009. All work has been under IAEA safeguards and operation will also be under safeguards.

The AEOI has said that construction of unit 2 at Bushehr was to proceed and that feasibility studies for a further 5000 MWe had been ordered.

After two years delay due to Iran's reluctance to return used fuel to Russia without being paid for it, two agreements were signed early in 2005 covering both supply of fresh fuel for the new Bushehr nuclear reactor and its return to Russia after use. The Russian agreement means that Iran's nuclear fuel supply is secured for the foreseeable future, removing any justification for enrichment locally.

Russia's Atomstroyexport by the end of January 2008 had delivered the 163 fuel assemblies for the initial core of Bushehr plus 17 reserve ones - 82 tonnes of fuel in total.  The fuel is enriched 1.6% to 3.62% and is under full international safeguards.  The Russian government had withheld supply as negotiations over Iran's uranium enrichment activities proceeded.  As of mid 2008 the reactor was 95% complete.  All major equipment had been installed and tested, a small amount of auxiliary items remained to be installed. The preliminary agreement states the first reactor of Bushehr nuclear power plant will be operated by the Russian-Iranian joint venture during the entire warranty period.  Commissioning is due late in the northern summer of 2008.

The anticipated 7 TWh/yr from the new reactor will free up about 1.6 million tonnes of oil (11 million barrels) or 1800 million cubic metres of gas per year which can be exported for hard currency.

Despite high-profile and serious disagreements with IAEA over uranium enrichment, the IAEA continues full involvement with Iran on nuclear safety issues, focused on Bushehr.

In April 2007 the Nuclear Power Production & Development Company of Iran (NPPD), closely associated with AEOI invited bids by August to construct two large third-generation PWR nuclear reactors - 1000 to 1600 MWe each - near Bushehr, to come on line about 2016.  It is not known whether any bids were received.

Then in May 2007 the AEOI said it was planning to build an indigenous 360 MWe light water reactor at Darkhovin in Khuzestan province in the southwest, at the head of the Gulf.  Two Framatome 900 MWe plants were about to be constructed here in 1970s.  The head of NPPD denied that these would use Chinese technology and in October 2008 announced that their design would begin shortly and be completed in six years.

Uranium enrichment

Iran has a major project developing uranium enrichment capability and in November 2008 the IAEA reported that 3800 centrifuges were operating, and over 200 more were being commissioned.  This program is heavily censured by the UN, since no commercial purpose is evident.

The antecedents of this go back to 1974, when Iran loaned $1.18 billion to the French Atomic Energy Commission to build the multinational Eurodif enrichment plant at Tricastin, and it secured a 10% equity in the enterprise, entitling it to 10% of output.  The loan was repaid with interest in 1991 but the plant has never delivered any enriched uranium to Iran since the new government in 1979 cancelled its agreements with Eurodif and ceased payments to it.  But in 1991 Iran revived its nuclear power ambitions and demanded delivery of its share of uranium under original contract, but this was refused by France due to political sanctions then being in force.  Iran views this refusal as proof of the unreliability of outside nuclear supplies and cites the Eurodif experience as the basis for achieving energy independence by developing all of the elements of the nuclear fuel cycle itself.   The AEOI still holds the 10% share in Eurodif.  The 10.8 million SWU plant operated by Areva started production in 1979 and is due to close soon after 2010.

In about 2000 Iran started building at Natanz a sophisticated enrichment plant, which it declared to IAEA only after it was identified in 2002 by a dissident group. This is known as the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), but also at Natanz a large underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) is being developed.

In June 2006 the PFEP at Natanz was operating a 164-centrifuge cascade commissioned in March which had produced 3.6% enriched material. Two other 164-machine cascades were being installed. Construction of the underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) was ongoing. Operations at the PFEP, FEP and the UCF are under international safeguards, though monitoring is constrained.  At the FEP, production hall A is being set up with eight units (A24-A28 initially), each of 19 cascades with 164 centrifuges - total 3116.

In November 2008 the IAEA reported that at the FEP, unit A24 was operating as were five units of A26, hence total of about 3800 centrifuges.  Installation and testing of 13 units of A26 continued (2132 more).  A total of 9760 kg of UF6 had been fed into the plant and 630 kg of low-enriched uranium had been produced.  Preparatory work on three more units of 3000 centrifuges was under way.  The target capacity is said to be 54,000.

These are all P1 centrifuges (the design having come from Pakistan). Iran is undertaking R&D on a variant of the more advanced P2 design, and may be testing that.

Other parts of fuel cycle, R&D

Iran has very small uranium reserves, apparently insufficient for any nuclear power program.  Underground mine development is at Saghand, and the Ardakan mine and mill is expected to produce 70 t/yr of uranium oxide from early in 2009.  A smaller mine is Bandar Abbas (from surficial salt plugs).

A uranium conversion plant (UCF) at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre has 200 t/yr capacity and started up in 2005. It is under IAEA safeguards.

The Teheran Nuclear Research Centre was established in 1967 by the AEOI. It has a US-supplied 5 MW pool-type research reactor which has operated since about 1967.

The Nuclear Technology Center of Isfahan operates four small nuclear research reactors, all supplied by China. It is run by the AEOI.

It is also building a 40 MW heavy water-moderated "research" reactor at Arak fuelled by natural uranium. The IR-40 design is very similar to those used by India and Israel to make plutonium for nuclear weapons. Construction is under way and the incomplete plant was "inaugurated" in August 2006. It is due for completion about 2009, to replace the old Teheran reactor. Iran has said that it will be under IAEA safeguards. A heavy water production plant is already in operation at Arak.

A fuel manufacturing plant is being constructed at Isfahan from 2003, its stated purpose being to serve the IR-40 reactor and Bushehr.

Non-proliferation

Iran joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1974. It has signed the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA but has not ratified it.

All Iran's facilities, except the Kalaye plant and the Arak heavy water plant, were under IAEA safeguards as of mid 2003. Details are in the Director-General's report to the IAEA Board of 6 June and 9 September 2003, and subsequent reports such as those to 23 May and 15 November 2007 on IAEA web site.

Iran originally attracted world attention in 2002 when some previously undeclared nuclear facilities became the subject of IAEA inquiry. On investigation, the IAEA found inconsistencies in Iran's declarations to the Agency and raised questions as to whether Iran was in violation of its safeguards agreement, as a signatory of the NPT.

An IAEA report in November 2003 showed that Iran had, in a series of contraventions of its safeguards agreement over 22 years, systematically concealed its development of key techniques which are capable of use for nuclear weapons. In particular, that uranium enrichment and plutonium separation from used fuel were carried out on a laboratory scale. Iran admitted to the activities but said they were trivial.

In August 2005 the IAEA Board called upon Iran to suspend work associated with uranium enrichment. In March 2006 the IAEA referred the issue to the UN Security Council. However Iran has not backed off from its activities in developing uranium enrichment.

On 24 March 2007 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution imposing further sanctions on Iran and reaffirming that Iran must take the steps required by the IAEA Board, notably to suspend its uranium enrichment activities. The IAEA reported in May 2007 that Iran had ceased providing information required under the Additional Protocol.

The IAEA stated clearly in November 2007 that unless the Additional Protocol was ratified and in place it is not possible for the Agency to establish that undeclared nuclear materials and activities are absent. Its "knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing." Meanwhile enrichment continues and hence a third UN Security Council resolution is likely.

The Iran situation has revived wider concerns about which countries should develop facilities with high proliferation significance - such as enrichment and reprocessing, even under safeguards if there is no evident economic rationale. At some point in the future, such a country could give three months notice of withdrawal from the NPT and reconfigure its facilities for weapons production. The USA asserts that Iran has been in fact developing just such a breakout capability.

Main References:
OECD NEA & IAEA, 2006, Uranium 2005: Resources, Production and Demand
IAEA web site, particularly Iran section