Despite extensive modifications in the last 10-15 years, the safety features of these (RBMK and first-generation VVER types) do not conform to Western standards. This does not in itself mean that they are unsafe, simply that their safety features differ from those mandated by western licensing requirements, and the EC requires that they be shut down at some agreed date before the end of their design life. Part of the background to all this relates to the Chernobyl disaster and decisions taken following the reunification of Germany.
After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, Western governments were quick to point the finger at RBMK and first-generation VVER reactors in Eastern Europe in order to emphasise the high levels of safety built into western designs. In the emotive discussion of the late 1980s, western safety standards were taken as the unquestioned yardsticks, while in fact the more profound differences were in safety culture. In the event, no western reactor was stopped and no western construction project aborted by political decision as a result of Chernobyl, and opinion polls supported continued operation of western plants.
After reunification, the new German government in 1989 examined the feasibility of upgrading the six second- and third-generation VVER reactors under construction in East Germany (one had just started up). While it was found that they could in fact be bought up to western safety standards at acceptable cost, they were abandoned because no investor could be found to take on the re-licensing risk in the context of Germany's nuclear bureaucracy and legal processes.
The collapse of socialism in the Comecon countries in 1989 and 1990 paved the way for openness and cooperation between countries that had for decades belonged to antagonistic blocs. The new democracies looked to the West for help in reforming their economies and their administrative structures. The EU set up its assistance programs and individual countries started bilateral programs. A leading player was Germany, which had gained much from its reunification. Following a German initiative, the G7 summit in Munich in June 1992 agreed on a multilateral Action Program for improving the safety of all Soviet-designed reactors in Central and Eastern Europe.
Two outcomes of this meeting were that assistance or short-term improvements for the two types of reactor would be conditional upon commitments to shut them down "as soon as possible", and that assistance for upgrades of newer plants would require safety studies and analyses of energy policies, energy alternatives and financing. The World Bank and EBRD, its European counterpart, were put in charge of this.
In effect, the G7 governments thus made efficient cooperation impossible because the Action Program interfered with the energy policies of sovereign states and also established complex administrative procedures to bog down any initiative. Above all, it failed to strike a balance between the interests of the G7 countries with those of the reform states. As a result, eight years after the Munich G7 summit, both sides have reason to be disappointed: none of the reactors considered least safe has been closed, and none of the newer plants has been upgraded in the framework of EU or EBRD credits. However, it is likely that EU funds will be made available for upgrading Bulgaria's Kozloduy 5 and 6, and it is hoped that EBRD and other credits will contribute to the completion and upgrading of Ukraine's Khmelnitski 2 and Rovno 4. But the only upgrading projects that have been or are being implemented so far, i.e. Mochovce 1 & 2 (Slovakia), Paks (Hungary) and Temelin (Czech Rep), were financed privately.
In implementing the Action Program, EU and EBRD consistently promoted early closure of the two condemned reactor types. In exchange for assistance in safety reviews at Kozloduy 1 & 2, they made Bulgaria promise to close all four of its older units by 1998. In return for German export credits for safety upgrades of a newer plant, Mochovce 1 & 2, Slovakia had to promise to close down two older ones (Bohunice 1 & 2) after Mochovce became fully commercial, but in the year 2000 at the latest. In 1995 Ukraine agreed to close the remaining units at Chernobyl by 2000 in exchange for assistance in modernising the Chernobyl-4 shelter and in improving the energy sector of the country, including the completion of two new nuclear reactors, Rovno 4 and Khmelnitski 2.
Later on, these countries recognised they were paying too high a price and that in fact the West failed to assist them speedily and efficiently in solving their problems. Therefore, all the Bulgarian and Slovakian units are still operating, and it is even uncertain whether the new 2000 deadline for Chernobyl will be achieved.
A new round of political manoeuvring was started with the invitation of reform states to join the EU. One of the conditions laid down by the EU in 1997 was that all nuclear plants concerned had to achieve Western safety standards within 7 to 10 years. Shut-down dates for older units are again on the agenda. Encouraged by the offer of 200 million euros from the EC, it appears that Bulgaria's Kozloduy 1 & 2 will be closed before 2003 and shutdown dates for the next two, Kozloduy 3 & 4, will be fixed in 2002. Slovakia has agreed to close its older units (Bohunice 1 & 2 ) by 2006 and 2008 respectively, despite this year completing a major refurbishing of them, including replacement of the emergency core cooling systems and modernising the control systems. Lithuania agreed to close its first RBMK unit, Ignalina-1, by 2005 and to fix a date for the second in 2004, (probably 2009).
As yet, it is not clear what the requirement of "Western safety standards" will mean for the other nuclear plants operating in reform states. Some plants have undergone or are undergoing major modernisation programs bringing them to Western safety level. WENRA, the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association, has been put in charge of analysing the safety level of all plants in EU accession candidates. The first report, published in March 1999, met strong criticism regarding some of the findings and it is being reviewed. However, it is understood to have found that the level of safety at Slovakia's condemned units was excellent, and that a similar level is achievable at Bulgaria's if the government decided to do the work and disregard the EU strictures.
Shut-down dates for condemned plants in EU accession countries
| Country | Plant | End of 30-year design lifetime | Dates fixed early 90s | Recent Agreements with EU |
| Slovakia | Bohunice 1 & 2 each 408 MWe | 2008, 2010 | by 2000 | 2006, 2008 |
| Bulgaria | Kozloduy 1+2 each 405 MWe | 2004, 2005 | by 1998 | before 2003 |
| Kozloduy 3+4 each 405 MWe | 2010, 2012 | by 1998 | 2006? (to be fixed in 2002) | |
| Lithuania | Ignalina 1 1380 MWe, RBMK | 2013 | before replacement of pressure tubes | by 2005 |
| Ignalina 2 1380 MWe, RBMK | 2017 | before replacement of pressure tubes | (to be fixed in 2004) | |
The first-generation VVER (V230 model) is a 440 MWe (gross) pressurised water design similar to the most popular western design (which is derived from power plants for submarines). The V230 has no containment structure in the western sense but has provisions for confinement of any radioactivity arising from a major accident. In addition its sturdy design, low power density and large volume of water mean that it has a considerable degree of inherent safety in these respects. Emergency core cooling systems have been significantly upgraded in the last decade.
Substantially from paper by W.Breyer, Siemens AG, PIME 2/00, also Siemens Power Journal Dec 99, PPNN Newsbrief # 4/99.
WMC reported fourth quarter production of 973 tonnes U3O8 from Olympic Dam, making 3198 tonnes for the year.
Total Australian production for 1999 came to 7055 tonnes U3O8, and exports were 7578 tonnes, the highest levels on record.
WMC 27/1/00, ERA 28/1/00, DISR.
Silex reaches enrichment development milestone.
Silex Systems has confirmed that its pilot module program for uranium enrichment is complete to the satisfaction of USEC and that the first milestone payment of US$ 5 million has been triggered. USEC has now begun funding the pilot plant engineering study, which is well underway. It will focus on the testing of prototype equipment to demonstrate the commercial potential of the SILEX laser isotope separation process for uranium. This second stage is expected to take 18-24 months and will involve a significant scale-up of resources in Australia, as well as contributions from US and South African teams.
USEC said that "the results of research look promising for an economically-attractive future enrichment technology", and Silex called the milestone "the most significant event of the company's short history". It "places Silex in an excellent position to build on the value of its technology through the pursuit of additional applications" in carbon, silicon and other enrichment, the economic potential of which "could match or exceed that of uranium".
However, just as Silex does not have all its eggs in one basket, neither does USEC, which is also pursuing centrifuge enrichment technology to replace its ageing 1950s-vintage plants in USA. USEC controls 40% of the world's uranium enrichment and holds exclusive commercial rights to the Australian SILEX process for uranium.
NuclearFuel 24/1, Silex 25/1 & 10/3/00.
WMC has published the results of its 1998-99 radiation dose measurements at Olympic Dam. In line with previous data, they show an annual average radiation dose to all designated employees of 1.9 mSv/yr, with a maximum of 9.2 mSv. All doses over 5 mSv were in the mine. The annual dose limit is 20 mSv (av), and normal background about 1.5 mSv/yr. As well as personal monitoring, 4500 measurements were made in the process plant and 11,500 underground. In the process plant dust was the main source, whereas in the mine 55% of exposure was from direct gamma radiation, and 33% from radon decay products.
WMC Radiation Dose Review 1998/99.
MOX test cargo delivered to Canada.
The Act drops plans for a central interim storage site in Nevada, but allows the EPA to retain responsibility for setting radiation protection standards at the Yucca Mountain repository site, and guards the $16 billion nuclear waste fund from misappropriation.
ENS NucNet news # 61 & 108/00, NEI 22/3/00.
After a tentative agreement for New York Power Authority to sell the Indian Point-3 and Fitzpatrick nuclear power plants to Entergy Corp for US$ 611 million, Dominion Resources topped this with a US$ 686 million bid. Both companies offered a further US$ 171 million for the fuel. Entergy then returned with a US$ 314 million increase in its bid, plus a further $300 million offer to establish a regional headquarters in New York state.
Under the original agreement with Entergy, NYPA would retain about $630 million in decommissioning funds for both plants and would apply this when required in about 15 years. It would also purchase all the Indian Point-3 output and 46% of that from Fitzpatrick until 2004. Entergy Nuclear already has six nuclear plants totalling 5654 MWe, and subject to approvals, these would have added 1780 MWe to its operations.
ENS NucNet business news # 16, 34 & 35/00, UI News Briefing # 00.09.
The US Department of Energy is proposing a US$ 306 million nuclear energy program budget for next year, a slight increase. For nuclear waste disposal it has requested US$ 437.5 million, three quarters from the civil nuclear waste fund (ie electricity consumers) and the rest from military sources. The waste figure includes $358 million for site characterisation at Yucca Mountain. Nuclear energy program requests include $92 million for R&D, with a 55% increase in the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative. Other nuclear-related items are $303 million for uranium enrichment decontamination and decommissioning, $223 for fissile materials control and disposition, $20 million for the international nuclear safety program (up from $15 million) and $100 million for a new non proliferation program which may encourage the suspension of Russian nuclear fuel reprocessing.
ENS NucNet news # 47/00.
US nuclear plants provide half nation's CO2 reduction.
Nuclear power plants were responsible for nearly half of the total voluntary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions reported for 1507 projects by US companies in 1998. Relative to a 1990 baseline, emission reductions from nuclear energy usage increased from an estimated 70 million tonnes carbon dioxide equivalent for 1997 to 100 Mt for 1998, according to the Energy Information Administration.
The combined industrial reduction in carbon dioxide for the year was 212 Mt. US nuclear power plants collectively avoid more than 600 Mt of carbon dioxide each year. The additional emission reductions at nuclear plants are due to efficiency improvements and increased generation. In 1998 generation at nuclear plants increased from 628.6 to 673.7 billion kWh. Because nuclear plants are emission-free, any increase in production represents a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions relative to fossil fuel alternatives.
EIA report 4/1/00, per NEI.
Swiss government proposes new atomic law, with new waste concept.
The waste disposal aspects arise from a working group set up last year which recommended a new concept, "controlled geological long-term storage", for geological disposal of radioactive wastes. This combines deep geological disposal with the principle of retrievability, and has three elements: test work, followed by building, filling and closing a main repository while leaving it accessible, and in parallel with the main repository building and filling a smaller one in the same rock. The small one would then remain open and provide opportunity for intrusive experiments to confirm the modelling work. Deep geological disposal is chiefly relevant to high-level and long-lived intermediate-level wastes, but conservatively it may be applied more widely.
The waste group, chaired by a geology professor, reaffirmed that the main goal of radioactive waste management was long-term protection of the biosphere, which ruled out either long-term surface storage or deep disposal in open repositories. It also recommended continuing with work investigating Wellenberg as a site for a low- and intermediate-level repository and the Opalinus clay beds for high-level waste, though both appeared to suitable for deep geological disposal and also the controlled long-term storage options.
The industry response to the government has asserted the need to keep both reprocessing and direct disposal options open, the former to enable "recuperation of the valuable raw materials uranium and plutonium" without compromising safety. It also rejects any restriction on operating lifetimes, as these would be "a politically-motivated anachronism".
ENS NucNet news # 441.98, 45 & 85-86/00.
European nuclear waste conference clarifies issues.
Some outcomes of the 5th European Commission conference on radioactive waste management and disposal have recently become available. The panel on radioactive waste management in Europe confirmed that geological disposal was the preferred solution, suggested that there should be more discussion of the similarities and differences between radioactive waste and chemotoxic waste management, considered that regional repository concepts were still premature and could be counterproductive for the establishment of national repositories, and pointed to the need for social consensus at the local level.
It was agreed that partitioning and transmutation (P&T), using accelerators, had the potential to reduce the radiotoxicity of wastes, particularly actinides, from spent fuel. However, this was still a few decades from realisation, and reliable separation was needed to ensure that stable isotopes were not transmuted into radioactive ones. The cost and technology of this partitioning together with the need to develop high-intensity accelerators ruled out short-term use. Fast neutron reactors still appear to be the best way to transmute plutonium, and this might be a rationale for their revival.
Euradwaste summaries 3/2/00.
European Commission sounds warning on emission levels.
Rather than decreasing in line with Kyoto pledges, Europe's greenhouse gas emissions are increasing and seem set to be 6 to 8% above 1990 levels (rather than 8% below) at the end of this decade. The EC has launched a Europe Climate Change Program to counter the situation by both promoting emissions trading and targeting emission reductions. In Europe, nuclear energy already avoids the emission of some 80 million tonnes of carbon dioxide annually, providing about 30% of the electricity in Germany, Spain, UK and Finland, 47% in Spain, 58% in Belgium and 75% in France.
ENS NucNet news # 89 & 90/00.
German nuclear talks resume.
The long-stalled "consensus talks" between the German "red-green" coalition government and heads of the main power utilities have resumed, following concessions by the government on spent fuel transport, and with a greater sense of political realism evident. A major sticking point is whether reactors operate for 30 or 35 years, or some other definition of operating lifetime. The question of how rapidly a change from reprocessing to spent fuel disposal occurs is also contentious. A legal battle seems unavoidable on proposed DM 19 billion taxation of DM 40 billion reserves set aside for waste disposal and decommissioning.
A major survey shows that 38% of Germans want their nuclear plants to continue in service for the forseeable future, while a further 25% support the replacement of older units with more modern reactors. The main industry trade union, the IG BCE, has rejected any premature phase-out, and called for retaining the nuclear option while developing new nuclear power technology.
ENS NucNet news # 31 & 32/00, background # 4/00.
UK heads roll over data substitution at MOX plant.
The Chief Executive of BNFL has resigned following the company's acute embarrassment about the substitution of data in a sample quality checking process at BNFL's Sellafield demonstration plant for producing mixed-oxide fuels (8 t/yr capacity, started up in 1993). His replacement is an experienced nuclear utility head whose "first priority is to win back the confidence of the customers who have been affected by the data falsification issue at Sellafield. This of course includes comprehensively tackling the safety and cultural issues" there.
The UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) report on the quality assurance failures at the plant criticised BNFL management at all levels and its safety culture. However, the report emphasises that "the totality of the fuel manufacturing quality checks are such that the MOX fuel produced for Japan will be safe to use". Though data on the manual checking of a 5% sample of output had been substituted, "this would not affect the safety performance of the fuel, given the automated primary diameter check on 100% of the pellets used in each fuel rod" plus X-rays of each when assembled. The NII said that the failure is essentially "a contractual issue" between BNFL and its customers. The Swiss nuclear safety authority has confirmed this assessment. Nevertheless, staff changes from bottom to top of BNFL are in response to the lapse.
The NII report notes that in the new 120 t/yr Sellafield MOX plant currently being commissioned the inspection processes are more fully automated, which is likely to obviate the problems. A review earlier this year of the demonstration plant by Lloyds Register of Quality Assurance reaffirmed the plant's ISO 9002 rating, though the plant is shut down until the NII is satisfied that its recommendations have been implemented.
Meanwhile Japan's Kansai Electric Power Company has suspended all contractual dealings with Britain's BNFL over the issue. This will apply to both fuel and reprocessing, "until the fabrication issue is satisfactorily resolved". Having apologised, BNFL pledged to "do whatever is necessary to restore the confidence that they should expect to have in BNFL" and its products. Kansai has made it clear that it does not intend to return the MOX fuel.
NucNet business news # 21/99, 2 & 3/00, news # 79/00, background # 6 & 7/00.
A further NII report addresses the storage of liquid high-level waste from reprocessing spent fuel and is sceptical of BNFL's current plans to eliminate the backlog of this by 2015. While accepting the company's safety case, "The NII believes that there has to be a demonstrable reduction in potential hazard (and hence risk) by reducing the amount of high-level waste stored as highly-active liquor and that the 'around 2015' date must therefore be achieved, as any shortfall will be publicly unacceptable." Failure to meet the 2015 deadline would also mean constraining reprocessing at that time, which would impact the operation of Magnox reactors whose spent fuel must promptly be reprocessed. The company says it is already addressing 17 of the report's 22 recommendations, and is commissioning a third vitrification line to condition the wastes.
ENS NucNet background # 6/00.
Following unanimous final approval from a committee of 60 experts, the Rostov-1 nuclear power plant at Volgodonsk seems likely to be completed this year. The VVER-1000 plant is 90% built, and will alleviate a regional electricity supply problem in the southern part of the country. Construction was started in 1978. The planned Rostov-2 will be an advanced VVER-640 type like that under construction at Sosnovy Bor near St Petersburg.
ENS NucNet news # 50/00.
Fifth waste shipment to Japan.
New Indian reactors started.
In March the first concrete was poured for India's Tarapur-3 and 4 reactors. These will be 450 MWe PHWR types, developed "with total indigenous design and technology" from the ten smaller Canadian-based designs now in operation. The first two units at Tarapur are small General Electric boiling water reactors.
ENS NucNet news # 515 & 520/99, Nuclear Power Corporation of India 8/3/00 & 10/3/00.
Siemens reaffirms commitment to nuclear future.
Looking at power costs, both the 1550 MWe EPR if built as a series in France or Germany and the SWR-1000 (with 8% discount rate) are competitive with gas combined cycle, at EUR 2.6 cents/kWh, but once depreciated their costs fall to about 1.5 cents/kWh compared with gas at 2.5 cents (capital being 60% of the nuclear plant costs but only 15% of the gas plant costs). The current-generation Konvoi plants operating in Germany produce power at 3.0 cents/kWh including full capital costs, and 1.5 c/kWh after complete depreciation. Part of the operational cost saving is due to improved fuel burn-up, and graphs chart the 50% increase in PWR burn-up (on thermal, not electrical basis) from 670 kWh/kg U in 1974 to 1000 kWh/kg in 1998, and BWR from 550 to 900 over the same period*, coupled with increased physical reliability of the Siemens fuel.
Extension of reactor operating life is a major factor in the economic operation of older plants worldwide. The main item requiring replacement is the steam generators, and Siemens has completed ten such exercises with downtime now ranging up to only 42 days. The Krsko plant in Slovenia is next be done, with the arrival of the two new steam generators creating news recently. It was the first western reactor built in E. Europe.
Siemens Power Journal, Dec 1999.
* 30 to 45 MWd/kg U for PWR and 23 to 40 MWd/kg U for BWR in conventional industry terms.
US report on energy scenarios to 2050.
The Electric Power Research Institute's 1999 study Electricity Technology Roadmap gives an upbeat assessment of the challenge of providing energy, and particularly electricity, to a world population expected to approach 10 billion by 2050. It envisages electrification reaching an extra 100 million people each year to 2050, more than twice today's rate of expansion. "The expanded use of carbon-free nuclear and renewable energy" is fundamental, with nuclear having "the most potential to contribute reliable carbon-free power generation on a large scale" over this period. The report suggests that a major increase in nuclear fuel utilisation is needed, along with improved thermal efficiency. Obstacles include "lack of credible capabilities for long-term storage or reuse of spent fuel" and public concerns re safety, but in addressing both these and the opportunities, it notes that "it is the commitment, not the technological means, which is missing." Hence "in the next decade, a proactive dialog between the industry and the public on the issue of nuclear power in the context of a sustainable energy future is seen as essential to rebuilding the needed commitment."
The Roadmap looks at the problems of scaling up renewables, "these readily-available but diffuse and intermittent energy sources". Growth beyond providing 2% of world electricity "will require not only breakthroughs in energy conversion, but a long-term, reliable and maintenance-free energy storage capability that can be integrated with renewable power sources". It compares its projections with World Energy Council 1998 scenarios, and as a result of increasing the proportion of electricity generation in primary energy from 38% today to 70% in 2050, generally envisages a much higher nuclear share but more realistic renewables contribution (each at 20% of total energy mix if coal diminishes).
EPRI Electricity Technology Roadmap, July 1999.
A new study comparing coal and nuclear power applies external costs to the question. Internal costs are taken from the 1998 OECD IEA study. They vary according to site and discount rate and show no clear advantage for either technology. External costs derived from the European ExternE study are then added, this being an expert assessment. For coal the figures are a high proportion of the internal costs, while for nuclear they are negligible even after factoring in hypothetical nuclear catastrophes. This shows up a clear advantage for nuclear, but the study goes on to add perceived public perception of risk. For climate change (applied to coal) and for nuclear it is "at least an order of magnitude higher than the level derived in expert assessments", but is ultimately unquantifiable. While it is these views which ultimately guide political choice it seems "that the public perceptions are formed in an unsystematic manner and are unstable over time", so "it is not possible to use economic analysis to determine what [the] choice will be."
M.Radetzki, Energy Journal 21,1, pp135-147.
After political setbacks in Australia, Pangea Resources is spreading its wings to other parts of the world in seeking opportunity to establish an international high-level nuclear waste repository. A new company, Pangea Resources International, has been set up, with Pangea Resources Australia as a subsidiary. The objective remains: to find a suitable site in a country willing to host an international repository, and organise the scientific, technical and commercial means of bringing it into operation. Pangea has so far focused on Australia, and will now also be looking at other parts of the former supercontinent Ð southern Africa and southern America, with a view to local equity being a major component of project development, expected to earn some US$ 3 billion/yr revenue.
NuclearFuel 24/1/00.
This remarkably informative book is based on a December 1998 Pugwash workshop which takes stock of the first half century of nuclear energy developments and looks at today's challenges from a mainly European perspective. Authors of the 18 chapters are from both policy and technical areas, covering industry and research. It is pitched for the slightly informed lay reader who may be concerned about how nuclear energy will feature in the context of a probable fivefold increase in energy demand to 2100.
There is critical evaluation of the reprocessing option for spent fuel, of high-level waste disposal options, plutonium use or disposition, accelerator-driven systems and of proliferation issues. Rather less emphasis is given to new reactor technology and reactor safety.
As an up to date smorgasbord of informed thought, this is hard to beat!
IH-L
See also Uranium Exchange graphs
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